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Following are pertinent portions transcript of Secretary's press conference today which may be distorted in press reports:

BEGIN TEXT.

QUOTE Q Mr. Secretary, a moment ago when you were referring to the assumptions of the '55 Foreign Ministers meeting you spoke of German reunification without using the other part - the assumption of reunification on the basis of free elections. I ask about that especially since Mikoyan is quoted this morning as having said yesterday, 'You're arming Germans with atomic weapons to be used against us and you're demanding free elections. One is not compatible with the other.' Is there any change in the free elections part of that proposal, or is that something that is negotiable in terms of reunification, if that is attainable?

QUOTE A We believe in reunification by free elections which was indeed the formula that was agreed to at the 'Summit' conference in 1955. It was agreed

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was agreed to by Khrushchev himself who was of course a participant in that conference. There they spoke of the reunification of Germany by free elections consistent^{with} with the German National interests and European security. That is approximately the language of the agreement.

QUOTE Q Mr. Secretary, is it our position that free elections are the only method of reunifying Germany? In other words, do we say, 'No free elections, no reunification'?


QUOTE A Well, we never have said that. The formula of reunification by free elections was the agreed formula. It seems to us to be a natural method. But I wouldn't say that it is the only method by which reunification could be accomplished.

QUOTE Q Mr. Secretary, to clarify an earlier answer that you made, you said that 'free elections are the natural method for unifying Germany, but it is not the only method.' Could you tell us what other methods there might be which could be acceptable to us and the West Germans and our allies?

QUOTE A No, I wouldn't want to speculate about that. There are all kinds of methods whereby countries and peoples draw together, and I merely said that I did not feel that we should treat any one method as an absolutely exclusive one. END QUOTE. END TEXT.

Secretary was obviously referring to fact that there are number of theoretical possibilities as to how German reunification could be achieved, to merge such as GDR's opting/with Federal Republic. Secretary pointed out however reunification

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reunification by free elections was agreed formula and seems to us to be natural method.

Hope foregoing will be helpful to you in coping with any excitement caused in Bonn by possible unbalanced press accounts. This portion of statement pulled out of context measured and firm presentation by Secretary of our position on German problem and Berlin. Full transcript of press conference transmitted in wireless bulletin.

Dulles

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS

JANUARY 13, 1959

NO. 28

SECRETARY DULLES' NEWS CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 13, 1959

The following is the State Department's release of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' news conference today, which is authorized for direct quotation.

SECRETARY DULLES: I am sorry that there has been so considerable an interval between this and my last preceding press conference. I hope that will not happen again. I surmise that quite a few questions have accumulated -- perhaps more than I can handle. But I will do the best I can, so go ahead.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your approach -- what is the United States approach to the talks at the end of this week with Mr. Mikoyan?

A. We expect in these talks to conclude the exchange of views which started when he was here before and when I talked with him and when he talked with the Vice President and our Ambassador to the Soviet Union who was also present at that time.


I think that the main purpose of these talks -- certainly as we see it -- is to get an understanding of what is in their minds and if possible to get them to understand what is in our minds. We don't look upon these talks as negotiations. We are not engaged in bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union in regard to matters that equally and to some extent even more concern others than ourselves. But we do think it is in the general interest to have a meeting of minds so that we at least understand each other and thereby eliminate the danger of miscalculations and inadvertent mistakes. There are enough real reasons for difficulty between us not to have them enhanced by what may be artificial and unreal misunderstandings.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does that view offer a possibility that you or the President would put forward to Mr. Mikoyan to take back to Moscow any new approach to the Berlin or German problems, or would you expect him to put forward anything of a similar nature on the Soviet plan?

A. Well, of course I cannot tell what he may put forward. As far as we are concerned, we have only to put forward our general approach -- our general views about the situation -- not specific proposals which we would have to clear first with our Allies.

Q. Is there any effort being made with our Allies to create some new proposals?

A. Well,



A. Well, we are having constant talks with our Allies about the situation and there are meetings, as an example, going on on this general topic before the Permanent North Atlantic Council Organization on almost a daily basis. We are talking almost on a daily basis with the Ambassadors of the principally interested countries. So the situation is in a very active state.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that actually we don't have at this point any counter proposals? That we are standing on our position previously and that we are just testing what change if any there may be in the Soviet approach?

A. Well, we are standing of course on the proposal and statement which we made -- the Allied Powers made -- with the approval of all the members of NATO, which was made I think on the last day of December. That proposal is not very old at the present time and we are not at the present time submitting any alteration of that proposal.


Q. Mr. Secretary, how about the proposals which were made at the Foreign Ministers' meeting which followed the Geneva Summit meeting of 1955? Do those still stand in your view or would they have to be reviewed in the light of the present conditions?

A. There are certain basic aspects of those proposals which I think remain valid and I would expect that they would continue to survive because of their basic validity. The basic proposition, as I recall, was; first, that Germany ought to be reunified; secondly, we could not expect reunification under conditions which would involve, or seem to involve, the Soviet Union in increased risks or losses. Therefore, it would be appropriate to couple any reunification of Germany with security provisions and limitations which would make sure that the Soviet Union would not, through the reunification, seem to have weakened its strategic or political position.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Mikoyan seems to have made quite an impact on American influential business people around the country. I wonder if you could tell us whether you have any concern about this impact in terms of future policy toward the Soviet Union.

A. I have not myself had any direct reports from any of these business people that you speak of to confirm what has been the nature of the impact that he made. He does speak, particularly through his interpreter, in terms that are appealing in many respects. I think that probably the talks have been good because I think that they have also given him some impression about our feeling and our unity about questions of Berlin and the like. I would think on that balance, as far as I can now judge, it has served a constructive purpose.

Q. Mr. Secretary,



Q. Mr. Secretary, do you gather from last week's conversation with Mr. Mikoyan that an impelling reason behind his visit and the last two notes was a fear of West German rearmament?

A. It is very hard to judge what the purpose or purposes of his visit are. There may be, probably are, several purposes-- not a single purpose. I do think that there is genuine and understandable concern on the part of the Soviet Union about the future of Germany. And there are two very basic philosophies on that subject: one that of the Soviet Union, one that of the Western powers. And it's very difficult to reconcile those two philosophies. I hope perhaps that in the further talks we have we can at least get to understand each other a little better on that subject.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a moment ago when you were referring to the assumptions of the '55 Foreign Ministers meeting you spoke of German reunification without using the other part, the assumption of reunification on the basis of free elections. I ask about that especially since Mikoyan is quoted this morning as having said yesterday, "You're arming Germans with atomic weapons to be used against us and you're demanding free elections. One is not compatible with the other." Is there any change in the free elections part of that proposal, or is that something that is negotiable in terms of reunification, if that is attainable?

A. We believe in reunification by free elections which was indeed the formula that was agreed to at the "Summit" conference in 1955. It was agreed to by Khrushchev himself who was of course a participant in that conference. There they spoke of the reunification of Germany by free elections consistent with the German national interests and European security. That is approximately the language of the agreement.


Q. Mr. Secretary, has there been any hint dropped to you by Mr. Mikoyan or any other Soviets that the Russians would now like a new meeting between the President and Mr. Khrushchev?

A. No. I have heard no suggestion to that effect.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what's your reaction, what's the United States' reaction to the Soviet proposal of last weekend for a peace conference to draft a new peace treaty for Germany?

A. That proposal highlights what I just referred to as the two different philosophies about dealing with Germany. The Soviet Union has consistently believed that Germany should be isolated, segregated, to a large extent demilitarized and neutralized and separated from close association with the neighboring countries.

We don't




We don't believe that that is a sound approach to the problem. On the contrary, we take the view that Germany and the German people are too great, vigorous and vital a people to be dealt with in that way and that that way is fraught with very great danger for the future. We believe that the future is best served by encouraging the closest possible relations between Germany and other Western European countries which are peace-loving and having such a close integration, military, political, economic, that independent, aggressive, nationalist action by Germany becomes as a practical matter impossible and also something that would not be desired.

Now, that has been the basic philosophy not only of this Administration but of the preceding Administration. It was reflected by the EDC (European Defense Community) and when the EDC proved impractical, the basic philosophy was carried forward in terms of the Brussels Treaty for Western European union, the bringing of the Federal Republic into NATO, integration of its forces in that way, the further development of economic unity through adding to the Coal and Steel Community, the Common Market, EURATOM, and measures of that sort with their common Assembly behind them. We believe that that is the proper way to deal with the German problem.

Now, as I say, that reflects a philosophy which is totally different from that of the Soviet Union. And the Soviet proposal of this peace treaty, which is similar to the proposals made in '52 and also again in '54 reflects the Soviet approach. As Adenauer said yesterday, it's a "brutal" approach. But it's in our opinion worse than a brutal approach, it's a stupid approach, because we don't think it will work. We believe the other approach is the sound one. Now, whether we can on that basis reach a meeting of minds with the Soviet Union, I don't know.

Q. Mr. Secretary, pursuing that same subject, is the American position on the reunification of Germany by free elections totally incompatible with a peace treaty which would to a degree limit German rearmament and German participation in military pacts?

A. We



A. We, of course, have in the Brussels Treaty for European Union very definite limitations on German armament which have been freely accepted, to some extent indeed proposed, by the Germans themselves, the Federal Republic of Germany. So that the concept of having limitations is not a concept which is in any way alien either to our thinking or to the thinking of the Federal Republic itself.

Now, you speak about military pacts. I don't think of these things as military pacts. I think of them as collective associations where people work together for peace and security, where they consult together, where they exchange views about their foreign policies, their political programs and the like. The idea that these collective security associations are aggressive military alliances which are bad is a concept which we reject totally. We believe that this type of association of nations coming together for collective security is the modern way whereby the family of nations gets the same kind of association that you get within a community where people associate together for their security through common institutions.

Q. So your answer to the second part of my question is yes it is incompatible with our stand?

A. Well, I don't remember your question clearly enough to go back and say the answer to the question is "yes." But I think the record will show whether or not my answer justifies that characterization.


Q. Mr. Secretary, in your conversation with Mr. Mikoyan, was the subject of China mentioned at any stage?

A. I don't recall that it was mentioned. It certainly did not assume any important role. It might possibly have been mentioned in a passing way, but not sufficiently that it registered particularly in my mind at the present time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Mikoyan has been reported by several sources as having emphasized that the Soviet proposal to make West Berlin a free city should not be regarded as an ultimatum. Can you tell us whether this is so and whether at the same time the Soviets have indicated any willingness to stop their plan for turning over their zone to the East Berliners and the East Germans sometime in June?

A. It has been made clear that there was no intention on the part of the Soviet Union to have their note treated as an ultimatum with a fixed time limit. And that is encouraging, because, as the Western allies said in their note of the end of December, we would find it very difficult indeed to negotiate under that kind of an ultimatum. So to that extent some progress has been made.

I would



I would not say that there has been any indication, as far as the substance of the matter is concerned, of any alteration in the Soviet position.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the United States asked the Cuban Government in any way or indicated in any way that they ought to discontinue the blood bath taking place in that country?

A. I don't think we have made any representations on that subject.

Q. Could you tell us what our position is regarding that?


A. It is our hope of course that this new Government of Cuba will be responsive to the aspirations of the Cuban people for a government of freedom, liberty, justice and law. We hope that its actions will conform to that ideal. The actual facts about what is taking place are not entirely clear or our information dependable at the present time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, going back to the German question, in an effort to bring the two political philosophies together I believe at one time you undertook to reassure the Soviet Government that if it accepted free elections in Germany, the West would guarantee that it would not seek to push its defense line farther to the east. Would you spell out that idea and indicate to us how this assurance would be made positive?

A. That was part of the concept as I recall that was put forward in '55, although perhaps not as clearly or as dramatically as might have been done. In part it has been covered by my answer to a prior question where I said that I do not think that it is reasonable to expect that the Soviet Union will give up positions which it has, if it thinks that by doing so it may be giving a strategic military advantage to those whom it regards - I think wrongly, but nevertheless which it regards - as potential enemies. We just can't expect that to happen. Therefore, if there is going to be any reunification of Germany, it has got to be under conditions which take into account realistically some of those very elemental, primitive facts of life. It was in order to meet that point of view that we tried to give reassurances to the Soviet Union along those lines, and it is still my view that we should be prepared to do that.

Q. In addition to that, would you recall for us what your position was on the proposal of Sir Anthony Eden at Geneva for the thinning out of troops and for some linking of the Warsaw with the NATO Pact?

A. I don't



A. I don't recall just what Sir Anthony Eden's proposals were in that respect. I think that we recognized that if events should move along the lines of the reunification of Germany, under these conditions there would almost automatically come about a lessening of the military requirements in the Western area and a consequent reduction of forces there. As far as the linking of the Pact was concerned, I don't think that that was ever proposed. At least, that is not my recollection. I think what was proposed was an overriding European security pact which would embrace perhaps the members of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact and which would contain assurances that if any one of the group should take aggressive action against the other, all of the other members would unite to come to the defense of the victim of attack. That would be a sort of an overriding European security proposal which would be superimposed upon the Warsaw Pact and the NATO powers.

Q. What is your position on that at the present time?

A. I still hold the view that that would be a sound way in which to proceed.


Q. Mr. Secretary, would you be willing to have the present East Germany demilitarized as part of such a settlement with Russia if they agreed to a reunification? In other words, keep East or West German troops out of that part of the country?

A. Well, something along that line is implicit in the suggestion that has been made. Of course, you have got to have ordinary police forces, forces to maintain law and order and internal security. But the proposal that was made earlier and which has been discussed here already did imply that the military position of the Western powers, NATO, should not be pushed forward into East Germany if there should be reunification.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if you say you are not negotiating bilaterally with Mr. Mikoyan during this visit, how do you propose to negotiate all these aspects of the German question that we have been discussing, or in fact do you propose to negotiate them?

A. Well, we have made a proposal to negotiate on the question of the reunification of Germany, Berlin, and European security. That proposal was made in our December 31st note. The Soviets have said that they are prepared to negotiate on the question of Berlin and on the question of a German peace treaty but not on the question of German reunification or at the same time on the question of European security.

Now there




Now there seems to be one common denominator which runs through all this, which is there seems to be a desire on both sides to get together and talk. There is not a meeting of minds as to what we talk about. There seems to be a sharp difference of opinion as to what we talk about, but there is at least a common denominator, I think, in terms of a feeling that there should be discussions. You might say that it has gotten down to the point where it is a matter of agenda. We know that the question of agenda can be a very serious stumbling block in the way of meetings. It was so at the time of the Palais Rose conference (Paris Session of Deputies of Council of Foreign Ministers, March 5 - June 21, 1951) and it has been a stumbling block in the way of a Summit meeting.

Q. But in Berlin in 1954 you accepted the Soviet agenda at the outset. It really made no difference in the substance of the talks. In this case would you be willing to accept perhaps the single word "Germany" as an agenda?

A. I think that our ideas as to the possible subject of discussion are broad. It is the Soviet Union that is trying to narrow the subject of discussion. We would not be alarmed by the broadness of the agenda. The only thing that alarms us would be the narrowness of the agenda, and to have a meeting which tried to deal with the question of a peace treaty and Berlin without being able at the same time even to discuss the question of the reunification of Germany or the question of European security. That seems to us unrealistic. It was recognized in the Geneva Summit meeting directive that there was a close interrelationship between the question of Germany and European security. We still believe that there is that interrelationship. So what concerns us would be not the broadening of the agenda but being debarred from discussing what we considered to be vital things by a narrowing of the agenda before the talks start.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Mikoyan seems to have struck on a formula for achieving personal talks with American leaders by a personal call on the Ambassador here. What would your reaction be to an application by Mr. Khrushchev to call on his Ambassador here and possibly have the same round of talks?

A. I doubt whether it would be possible for the Prime Minister to come here in the same atmosphere of informality that attended the visit of Mr. Mikoyan. I would just like to recall, however, that the President in his letter to the then Premier Bulganin, I think early last year, did invite the coming to this country of important persons in the Soviet Union. But I think also he made clear that that did not comprehend anybody so important as Mr. Khrushchev. (Laughter)



Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what you expect will be accomplished during the forthcoming visit of the Argentine President to Washington?

A. We believe that this visit will serve to consolidate the good relations between our two countries. The Argentine has always been one of the very important members of the Organization of American States. There are very important interests that we have in common. We are encouraged by what seems to us to be a sound approach to many problems being taken by President Frondizi. As you know, there has been a very considerable amount of economic assistance extended in that connection by various banking institutions. We have no specific objective in mind in connection with this talk. We do think that an exchange of views about general matters will be in our mutual interests. We look forward to it very much.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you a question about your health, if I may. Can you tell us how you are feeling now, and, especially, whether or not you feel capable to carry on your present job in view of the fact that it looks like we are going into a very active period of diplomatic negotiation?

A. Well, I am feeling good. I feel able to carry on. At any time I don't feel able to carry on, you will know it.


Q. Mr. Secretary, is it our position that free elections are the only method of reuniting Germany? In other words, do we say, "No free elections, no reunification"?

A. Well, we never have said that. The formula of reunification by free elections was the agreed formula. It seems to us to be a natural method. But I wouldn't say that it is the only method by which reunification could be accomplished.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the question of the atomic test negotiations in Geneva, in view of the new scientific findings as released by the White House recently, is it now the position of this Government that you would not sign a test suspension or stoppage based exclusively on the findings of the experts, the agreed findings of the experts at Geneva last summer?

A. It is a bit too early yet to evaluate that information in terms of what may be the techniques available for detection. I think that that information gained from our recent experiments indicated that the techniques which had originally been contemplated were perhaps inadequate. But very careful studies are being made to see whether there cannot be found ways of detection which can really be brought within the compass of the original report of the experts, so that no serious or revolutionary change would be required.

Q. Well,



Q. Well, Mr. Secretary, are we also giving consideration to what appears to be the alternative if such technical means cannot be found; that is, to establish a threshold below which explosions underground, which would presumably not contaminate the air, would be permitted in the so-called smaller-sized weapons?

A. That is a possible fall-back position which has been considered. It was a position, you may recall, which was presented by Senator Gore when he came back from the discussions. But we see no reason at the moment to come to that position, because, as I say, we haven't gotten down yet to the details of a control system, and as to what would be acceptable, what would be practical. Now if it turns out that what is acceptable or what is practical leaves an area where there could be undetected underground explosions, then at that point we would have to consider I think this alternative.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to clarify an earlier answer that you made, you said that "free elections are the natural method for unifying Germany, but it is not the only method." Could you tell us what other methods there might be which could be acceptable to us and the West Germans and our Allies?


A. No, I wouldn't want to speculate about that. There are all kinds of methods whereby countries and peoples draw together, and I merely said that I did not feel that we should treat any one method as an absolutely exclusive one.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you said that the Soviet plan for Germany is "stupid" because it wouldn't work, in what sense did you mean it wouldn't work? What bad result did you see flowing from it?

A. I believe that if you try to isolate and segregate a great people like the Germans in the center of Europe that they will become a restive and dangerous force; they will attempt to gain advantages to themselves by trying to play off the East against the West. I don't think that you can put the Germans within the kind of a smothering blanket that the Soviet Union has in mind and expect that that will hold. That, in a way, was the approach of the Treaty of Versailles, and it just didn't work. And I don't think it will work again. I think that a so-called "neutralized" and largely demilitarized Germany, attempted to be demilitarized in the middle of Europe, is just something that won't work, and that, instead of trying to isolate Germany the best way is to tie Germany in.

Now, that is the basic thesis of Adenauer. I believe that Adenauer's claim to greatness rests upon his effort to assure that Germany will not again follow the path which Germany followed in 1914 and again in 1939. He is the one who has invented, you might say, this solution. And I believe it is the most practical and sound solution for those who really want to end for all time the kind of danger that has come from Germany in the past.

Q. Mr. Secretary,



Q. Mr. Secretary, on the suspension you mentioned a moment ago, that there had not been time yet to evaluate some of the technicalities of detection and other aspects. If this is true, and if the results will have a very direct bearing on whatever agreement, if any, is reached, why are we negotiating until those technical subjects are answered? Doesn't it, rightly or wrongly, put us in a position of seeming to be hypocritical on the matter?

A. I don't think so. The studies are going on at a very active rate by our own scientists, and it may very well be that they will find that while there are means of explosion of a character not heretofore adequately evaluated, there are, also, ways whereby these control posts that were recommended by the experts can cope with the problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in this connection, what is your feeling about the inclusion of China in any disarmament agreement or test agreement on nuclear suspension?

A. I take it you are referring to Communist China, or the Republic of China?

Q. Communist China. (Laughter)

A. Well, I have said before that ultimately I think that a system of detection should be geographically world wide in its scope. But there is no present effort to make it so, and it is more or less agreed that for the purpose of the present negotiations the inspection at this stage will be limited to areas controlled by the three powers now possessing nuclear weapons.

Q. Thank you, Sir.

* * *

State -- FD, Wash., D.C.

